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In the early years of twentieth century military history, the status of physical activities 
in the armed forces moved from necessary distraction to valuable operant conditioning. Athletic 
excellence brought not only fitness skills, much welcome and serviceable on the battlefield but, 
as historian Steven W. Pope demonstrated, also conveyed moral or normative values, which 
contributed to the building of America as a nation.1 In 1905, Lieutenant-Colonel William W. 
Wotherspoon of the US Army insisted that each soldier receive both “physical training, to 
develop his body so that it may meet the unusual and exceptional strains of warfare, and mental 
training that he may apply the lessons of experience and bring to bear upon the affairs of war 
every resource which science can give.”2 At that time, sports became increasingly popular with 
military leaders; they recognized its potential as a useful instrument of socialization in the 
armed forces, raising soldiers’ awareness of the necessity to be fit to fight, both physically and 
mentally, for conflict resolution and global security. 
As the Great War in Europe put increasing pressure on domestic issues, many civilians 
took upon themselves to organize the “Americanization” of the ever-growing number of 
“hyphenated-Americans,” who had been arriving in the country since the 1870s.3 As a result of 
the growing concerns with public health and patriotism, physical exercise entered military 
training camps in a major way: it was designed to train draftees and soldiers with both combat 
and civilian skills. Military intelligence officers believed that festivities were instrumental in 
keeping up army morale and maintaining fitness in the ranks, but also, as historian William J. 
 
1 Pope, Steven W. Patrioric Games: Sporting Traditions in the American Imagination, 1876-1926 (Knoxville, 
TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1997): 121-78. 
2 Wotherspoon, William W., “The Training of the Efficient Soldier,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 26 (July 1905): 151. 
3 The aim of “Americanization” was to allow for a better assimilation of the largely pauperized immigrant 
working-class population in the labor workforce, at a time when modernization was under way. Private 
organizations, such as the National Americanization Committee (NAC), or individuals, such as John Foster Carr, 
a long-time member of the American Library Association (ALA), took part in this process. 
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Baker noted, promoting a strong level of patriotism.4 In 1917, these civilian officers crossed 
the Atlantic alongside the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), lending their expertise in 
domestic surveillance and psychological warfare abroad. As the US military was making more 
regular incursions beyond its own borders, Paul Hensler writes that civilian officers, on their 
part, observed “the sport’s commitment to the war effort and direct support of the troop 
abroad.”5 On the same note, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) helped the army 
establish valuable contacts with foreign populations overseas through sporting events after the 
war. As Brett A. Berliner explained, baseball games were organized “under the direction of 
competent American athletic directors provided by the Department of sports of Les Foyers du 
Soldat;”6 the same was true for basketball games. These initiatives intensified in peacetime, 
lending themselves to the promotion of American forces on French soil. 
However, the development of a more durable US military presence in France after the 
Second World War revived the interest for the promotion of American sports overseas. Little 
by little, sport became a tool for the nascent Cold War public diplomacy network, serving both 
civilian and military purposes.7 Public diplomacy, which historian Brian A. McKenzie defines 
as an expression of American interests abroad, aiming to showcase the national culture through 
any available medium, is a practice shaped by the trends and interests of the military and 
political circles to protect US national security.8 Indeed, historian Walter Lafeber states that US 
public diplomacy is entrusted with a prominent domestic function, pursuing “a strategy that is 
workable abroad and developing a political explanation that creates and maintains sufficient 
consensus at home.”9 During the Cold War, public diplomacy officers organized promotional 
events promoting the US armed forces to the local population. On the other hand, the military 
promoted a more direct approach to public diplomacy in order to assist with national security 
issues and bolster transatlantic commitment, sending some of its best-rated basketball teams to 
play against local, European and even rival teams from beyond the Iron Curtain. As this paper 
aims to demonstrate, based on oral interviews and US archival records from the State and 
Defense Departments, while the recurrent tensions between military and civilian offices drove 
 
4 Baker, William J. Playing with God: Religion and Modern Sport (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007): 123-28. 
5 Hensler, Paul. “’Patriotic Industry’: Baseball’s Reluctant Sacrifice in World War I,” NINE: A Journal of 
Baseball History and Culture Vol. 21 No. 2 (Spring 2013): 100. 
6 Berliner, Brett A. “‘Chasing the Elusive Pill’: YMCA Men, the Paris Baseball League and Making Baseball 
French, 1919–1925,” International Journal of the History of Sport Vol. 28 No. 13 (2011): 1777. 
7 For US public diplomacy, see: Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: 
American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Mor, Ben D, “Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy”, Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 2006): 157-
76. For sport diplomacy, see: Gygax Jérôme. « Diplomatie culturelle et sportive américaine: Persuasion et 
propagande durant la Guerre froide », Relations internationales Vol. 3 No. 123 (2005): 87-106; Verschuuren 
Pim. “Les multiples visages du ‘sport power’”, Revue internationale et stratégique, Vol. 1 No. 89 (2013): 131-
136; Heather L. Dichter and Andrew L. Johns. Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft and International Relations 
since 1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2014). 
8 McKenzie, Brian. Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan (New York, 
NY: Berghahn Books, 2008): 2-4.  
9 Cited in: Andrew L. Johns. “Hail to the Salesman in Chief: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and the 
Presidency” in Osgood, Kenneth and Andrew K. Frank (Ed.), Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and 
Public Opinion in the American Century (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2010): 2. Ricaud, 
Raphaël. “La ‘Public Diplomacy’ des Etats-Unis: Théories, pratiques, effets (1948 - 2008)” (Dissertation: 
Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre, 2012): 281-305. 
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public diplomacy practitioners to a dead-end, a few army sportsmen willingly assumed the role 
as “basketball ambassadors” during the Cold War. 
First, we will observe how sport – and especially basketball – participated in the 
necessary construction of a public diplomacy program to promote the military in France. Then, 
we are going to see how such a program contributed to the security of US armed forces, 
stationed in the most remote areas of France during the Cold War. Finally, we will explain how 
military and civilian public diplomacy officers jointly organized the work of “basketball 
ambassadors” in France during this time period, and how this process played an essential role 
in the safeguarding of the United States’ national security from abroad. 
 
 
1) SPORT AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY NETWORK 
IN FRANCE 
 
Sport played a pivotal role in the construction of the public diplomacy program of the 
United States, which were initially designed to counteract the increasing number of acts of 
espionage during the First World War. But in the interwar years and during Second World War, 
foreign countries continued to spy on the US, targeting military facilities and collecting 
information, a trend which continued well into the Cold War. Public diplomacy programmes 
started during the First World War, as a project to inform the American people about US 
participation in the conflict, but gave rise to considerable distrust and a deep sense of alienation 
felt by many. In times of war, it seemed only natural to mobilize the powers and means 
necessary to form a unified front against the Central powers, whose positions were directly 
threatening the United States. Sport in general, and basketball in particular, played a crucial 
role in allaying the concerns raised by the launching of a full-scale propaganda machine, both 
at home and abroad. From the onset of Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist doctrine,10 questions 
about US public diplomacy have been inseparable from those of national security.11 In the mid-
1910s, the US Navy and War Departments struggled in their fight against recurrent acts of 
espionage on military premises in the United States. A few senators in the legislative branch 
worried that such leaks might put domestic security in jeopardy. In 1916, they supported a bill, 
which targeted employees “on contracts for the government,” to punish “any one 
communicating to any foreign government any defence secret of the United States.”12 Any 
civilian or press agency that publicized pieces of information could be suspected of intelligence 
with the enemy. 
When the Espionage bill was introduced a year later, press organizations and civil 
society groups voiced their concerns about the safeguarding of their freedom of speech. Indeed, 
Executive Order 2604 granted full control over the main means of communication to the 
 
10 Tournès, Ludovic. Les Etats-Unis et la Société des Nations (1914-1946) (Genève: Peter Lang, 2015): 31-4. 
11 Nau, Henry R. Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015): 48-50. 
12 “To Guard Defense Secrets: Senate Committee Acts Favorably on Bill Introduced by Tillmann,” The New 
York Times, May 3, 1916. 
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military.13 One week later, Wilson received “a communication recommending the creation of a 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), combining the two functions of censorship and 
publicity.”14 The CPI, well-known among historians of US public diplomacy, would be chaired 
by George E. Creel, a civilian. Although the protection of defense secrets is a necessary 
condition in times of war, manipulative opinion-making processes never played well with 
American audiences; the American democratic model, which demands citizens to trust public 
judgment, is not fit for “grey areas,” where information can be subject to secrecy. But news and 
advertising corporations, which had first voiced concerns over censorship, cooperated 
nonetheless: they started to hammer home the message that the United States had to fight a 
battle against an enemy abroad, at the same time as it had to counteract the manipulations of an 
enemy within its own borders. Public diplomacy worked in the interest of national security. 
From 1917 to 1919, the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to disseminate war information 
abroad rested on a formal but improvised network of diplomatic outposts called “United States 
Information Services” (USIS); this acronym would be used well into the Cold War.15 But 
military intelligence officers, who were more comfortable with backroom negotiations, quickly 
identified the limits of public diplomacy.16 Indeed, the American Forces in France (AEF) was 
“pulling out for home as fast as the nature of its duties allowed,” while some Doughboys, as 
they were nicknamed, remained exposed to changing ideologies on French soil.17 In order to 
counteract adverse effects of the military intervention in France, such as the import of 
bolshevism in the United States, the two main intelligence offices in the War Department – the 
Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) – assisted 
private organizations in the establishment of soldier-education programs overseas.18 Soldiers 
were also invited to practice sports, such as basketball, in operations placed under the auspices 
of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). On the one hand, basketball games and 
tournaments served to keep up army morale after the Great War; on the other hand, they were 
instrumental in creating conditions for social interaction between soldiers and civilians of both 
countries. According to historian Fabien Archambault, political elites considered basketball 
was crucial for enhancing national prestige abroad.19 In the small city of Chaumont, in the 
northeast corner of France, for example, soldiers could find both the US army General 
Headquarters and the YMCA entertainment division.20 
 
13 Executive Order 2604: “Censorship of Submarine Cables, Telegraph and Telephone Lines," April 28, 1917. 
14 “Censorship and Publicity,” The New York Times, May 3, 1916. 
15 Arndt, Richard T., The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Washington D.C: Potomac Books, 2005): 30-1. 
16 At the end of the war, the military was faced with the duty to repatriate 4 million soldiers, not only to their 
homeland but also to civilian life, and more specifically to their jobs. 
17 Marquis, James, “The Last Squad Carries On: Remnant of America’s Overseas Army is but a Shadow of the 
Greatest Expeditionary Force,” The American Legion Weekly 1 No. 19 (November 7, 1919): 10. 
18 The most notable achievement to-date remains the Library War Service of the American Library Association 
(ALA), launched the American Library in Paris in 1919. 
19 Archambault, Fabien and L. Artiaga. “Les soldats du stade: une armée de champions?” Revue de la Société 
des Amis du Musée de l’Armée No. 145 (June 2014): 27-57. 
20 Hanson, Joseph M. (ed.). The Inter-Allied Games, 22nd June to 6th July 1919 (Published by the Inter-Allied 
Committee, 1919): 90. Basketball exhibits resulted in the participation of a French and an American national 
team of soldiers in the Inter-Allied games in the summer of 1919. The American team won the competition 
against Italy, while France finished third in the series. Needless to say, the French team received only little 
training: “The team was entered not for the purpose of winning laurels for the French but because of the desire to 
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On the other hand, intelligence officers were less open to publicity stunts organized by 
the few diplomats of the CPI. As a matter of fact, the army had shaped its own understanding 
of the nature and value of public diplomacy: as historian Peter Marquis explains, the Inter-
Allied Games of 1919, which stood at the apex of military diplomacy after World War One, 
served to enhance the physical superiority of US soldiers in regard to their European 
counterparts.21 But in the interwar period, civilian organisations kept the upper hand. Indeed, 
in June of 1920, Congress signed an update to the National Defense act of 1916, allowing for 
the development of the National Guard and the Army Reserve, but limiting the growth of the 
Regular Army in – and of – the United States. The purpose was not merely to meet popular 
hopes for the signs of a long-lasting peace; it was rather to cut down expenses, at a time when 
the federal government did not yet have to provide an answer to a national economic crisis. The 
1929 stock-market crash would ultimately allow for less leverage than in any prior negotiations 
over the questions of appropriations and staff expansion. As a consequence, the interwar 
political paradigm undermined the competitiveness of sport as a core component of the army’s 
public diplomacy and never fostered the development of what has been called an "army of 
athletes" after World War I.22 As historian Barbara Keys writes, “as the approach of war became 
ever more apparent, international sport competitions took on a distinctly militarist flavor and 
athletes became increasingly indistinguishable from soldiers.”23 
But in the United States, sport practices remained locked in the dormant power struggle 
between military and civilian offices. After a decade of decisions solely driven by domestic 
issues and national security interests, President Franklin D. Roosevelt started preparing 
America for war. In fact, World War Two manifested the gap between “the Anglo-American 
brand of sport, as a form of culture steeped in an ethos of individualism, competition, and 
achievement that reflected its origins as an offshoot of capitalism” and the Soviet Union’s 
attempt “to build an alternative international system based on a distinctly ‘proletarian’ brand of 
sport and physical culture that eschewed individualism and record-seeking.”24 In March 1941, 
the War Department activated the Morale Branch of the army to conduct operations on military 
bases on US soil only.25 Sport was instrumental in organizing the free-time soldiers had on their 
hands: “In thirty-seven of the larger camps, wrote Major General Frederick H. Osborn in 1942, 
there have been built large field houses, capable of seating four thousand men, ideal for 
basketball, mass athletics, boxing and even drill in bad weather.”26 Basketball became a 
wartime favorite among higher-ranked military officers, in spite of the predominance of 
 
have competitors in as many events as possible and also in order to acquire a further knowledge of the new 
sport.”  
21 Marquis, Peter. “La grenade, la batte et le modèle américain. Baseball et acculturation sportive dans la France 
de la Première Guerre mondiale,” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains n°251 (2013): 55. 
22 “How Uncle Sam Has Created an Army of Athletes,” Scientific American 120 no. 6 (February 8, 1919): 114-5. 
23 Keys, Barbara J. Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006): 186-7. 
24 Keys. Globalizing Sport: 159. 
25 The US Army Morale Branch was created on the order of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on March 8, 
1941. It was composed of six complementary services: The Exchange Service, the Motion Pictures Service, the 
Welfare and Recreation Division, the Services Division, the Information Division and the Morale Research 
Division. 
26 Osborn, Frederick H., “Recreation, Welfare, and Morale of the American Soldier,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 220 (1942): 52. 
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baseball as the quintessential American sport.27 The latter was seen as an essential means for 
domestic propaganda, while basketball was regarded as an efficient instrument for physical 
fitness and mental sharpness. It was the sport Lieutenant-Commander Frank H. Wickhorst 
favored: 
 
Besides its use as a general body conditioner and a builder of physical stamina, basketball 
develops precise optical, muscular and mental coordination, body balance, deft touch and quick 
perceptions – factors which are benefit of to pilots. It improves the cadets’ alertness and aids them 
in making instantaneous judgments and decisions.28 
 
In times of war, service basketball fit the traditional pattern of socialization in the armed forces: 
it helped maintain the soldiers’ fitness and army morale. 
The end of the Second World War shows that sport played an increasing role in 
international relations. The Liberation of France was rich in sporting events, which took place 
mainly within US army camps. Indeed, due to the manipulation of sport by totalitarian States 
in Europe in the interwar years, and in order to not hurt French national pride, the US military 
took a stance against postwar policies enforced in other defeated European countries – such as 
Germany. The army therefore did not stimulate the acculturation process as they had done after 
the First World War, and limited the use of sports – including basketball – in their effort to 
improve organized community relations after World War II in France.29 Four factors can 
explain this anomaly. Firstly, the mandate of the Office of War Information (OWI), the wartime 
joint civilian and military propaganda bureau of the United States, was somewhat limited. OWI 
officers were mostly public diplomats in military outfits, and performed as such. As civilians, 
they demonstrated their inability to understand the standards attached to basketball exhibits in 
post-conflict situations. They showed more interest in monitoring the army’s public image – 
through large-scale exhibitions – than in developing contacts with the local populations. 
Secondly, the public diplomacy network moved into a new phase of its development, and was 
almost inactive from 1945 to the end of 1947. With the advent of the Cold War, the ongoing 
threat against the US national interest could be sensed both within and outside the borders of 
the United States. The military took definite control over most of the public diplomacy network 
and activities, from the last days of the OWI in 1945 to the creation of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. Only the Smith-Mundt act of 194830, which forbade 
public disclosure of broadcast material on the domestic front, acted as a as a bulwark against 
 
27 In his famous “Green Light Letter” of January 1942, Roosevelt told Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who 
sought advice on whether the professional baseball league should “continue to operate” in time of war, that he 
“honestly [felt] that it would be best for the country to keep baseball going.”  
28 Quoted in Wartime Basketball: The Emergence of a National Sport during World War II (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2016): 132. 
29 For a comparison with Germany, see: Bolz, Daphné. “Sports Policy, the Press and the Origins of the Cold War 
in Occupied Germany, 1945–51,” Sport in History Vol. 35 Issue 2 (June 2016): 195-216; Dichter, Heather L. 
“Sporting Democracy: The Western Allies' Reconstruction of Germany through Sport, 1944–1952” 
(Dissertation: University of Toronto, 2008), 340 p. 
30 US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Pub. L. No. 95–352 § 204, 1948). 
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propaganda. Meanwhile, in France, the higher-ranking military staff monitored part of the 
strategy of USIS outposts.31 
A close look at the militarization process of the networks of information shows that 
basketball has played the role of a multifaceted instrument in US public diplomacy. The postwar 
period was marked by social unrest and demands to end racial segregation in the United States, 
which tarnished the reputation of America as a suitable democratic nation. And in 1951, State 
Department officials counted on the showmanship of the Harlem Globetrotters, an all African-
American team, to improve perceptions – however false – of equal opportunity in the United 
States.32 By the 1950s, basketball was already well known to the French, so much so that they 
had started appropriating what they had first encountered in several YMCA huts in the 1920s. 
In fact, the interwar years saw the birth of “a French sport by essence,” known as ripopo.33 
Considered an improvised and more fluid type of basketball, almost exempt of dribbling, ripopo 
called for an opposition of Ancients against Moderns to be solved in future confrontations of 
French and American sport traditions in times of peace.  
 
 
2) A SMALL-SCALE SPORT MODEL SUITABLE FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 
PURPOSES 
 
The militarization process of the American public diplomacy network, which started in 
the mid-1910s, reached its zenith with the advent of the Cold War. For the several intelligence 
offices of the War Department – which was renamed Department of Defense in the late 1940s 
–, it seemed clear that sports would play a role in the military strategy. The interest in sports 
grew with the installation of US military bases in France, under the auspices of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).34 In the early 1950s, thousands of young American 
soldiers settled in rural parts of the country. Military and civilian public information officers 
had an unusual balancing act to perform: to ensure the stability of Western Europe to guarantee 
the security of the United States in return, and to press forward with the transition of the French 
economy to a free-market economy, with the Marshall Plan, for example. In 1954, despite a 
staunch effort by the United States to further the cause of a continental defence system, the 
French voted against the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC). Despite a 
heightened sense of urgency, most US government officials felt that European dislocation could 
 
31 As Heather L. Dichter writes, the United States developed their public diplomacy programs, especially in 
sport, because “they came out of World War II with a renewed economy and, unlike its European Allies, did not 
have to rebuild its infrastructure resulting from the destructiveness of war.” Postwar reconstruction in France 
“demanded a greater allocation of finances” on the latter’s behalf, allowing civilian officers to carry out an all-
out public diplomacy effort. Dichter, Heather L. “Sporting Democracy,” op. cit.: 84. 
32 Thomas, Damion L. Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2012): 70-4. In France, the Globetrotters played several games over 33 days, sometimes on simple 
tennis courts; also, an eponymous film was screened in USIS outposts across the country.  
33 Claverie, Eric. “Le ripopo ou la naissance d’un style français” in Double jeu: Histoire du basketball entre 
France et Amériques (Paris: Vuibert, 2007): 155-166. 
34 On April 4, 1949, Harry S. Truman signed the North Atlantic treaty, which led the way to the creation of a 
military alliance of Western countries. Following the Berlin blockade of 1948, and as the Soviet Union exploded 
its first atom bomb, NATO was designed to protect American interests in a developing and escalating Cold War, 
in countries such as France where the Communist Party was prominent. 
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partly be countered by better planning of public information events organized on and outside 
the bases, especially regarding France’s position toward the rearmament of Germany – the main 
reason for the failure of the EDC.35 They were convinced of the necessity to disconnect wartime 
practices from public diplomacy procedures in peacetime, in order to convince the French, 
“after the start of the Cold War, [that] Germany was no longer an enemy to punish but a new 
ally in urgent need of help if it was to recover,”36 writes Victor Gavin. But only a proven record 
could persuade the military establishment to loosen – let alone relinquish – its grip on the public 
diplomacy programs.  
Indeed, General Alfred M. Gruenther, a high-ranking military official of the US Army 
in France, felt frustrated by the lack of efficiency of civilian public diplomacy practices. He 
believed military methods of psychological warfare were far more efficient than civilian ones. 
Give the French an afternoon with a few servicemen on a base, he once told NATO ministers 
in Paris, “and they will depart as crusaders.”37 New public diplomacy practices emerged from 
the debates, triggered by the anticipation of the failure of the EDC. At the request of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) director Theodore C. Streibert, USIS-France created a 
bureau in charge of military affairs, which reported directly to Leslie S. Brady, the newly 
appointed Chief Public Affairs Officer (CPAO) in Paris.38 Together, they offered a streamlined 
approach to public diplomacy, which eventually took the needs and concerns of the military 
into consideration.39 A report forwarded by Brady to the USIA in Washington shows how 
civilian agencies designed a method to shape the image of the United States in France. The 
public image of the military fell under the theme of “European integration.”40 But Brady 
insisted that “approaches must be oblique or through indigenous groups.” Furthermore, 
“because the European Army and the European Political Community are totally European 
concepts, the approach must in most cases be indirect.” Most importantly, they considered that 
“top-level assertions from Washington” had to be excluded from this approach, therefore 
prioritizing military information officers over civilian ones when it came to local matters.41 
Just as was the case after the First World War, sports were used to keep up army morale 
and allow soldiers to engage in social interactions with fellow servicemen or civilians. At this 
point, it seems important to underline the fact that the Selective Service Act of 1948, as well as 
the Executive Order 9981, establishing equality of treatment and opportunity in the Armed 
Services and signed the same year, had modified the social fabric of the armed forces. The army 
understood that, more than even before, the task to create social cohesion in its ranks was 
crucial, and was to be carried out by the military intelligence officers on site. As expected, the 
 
35 See: Creswell, Michael. A question of balance: how France and the United States created Cold War Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
36 Gavin, Victor. “Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950–
1954),” French History Vol. 23 No. 1 (2009): 71. 
37 “NATO Conference on Information Policy: Statement by General Gruenther at NATO Ministerial Meeting,” 
17 December 1954, NATO Archives, AC/87-D/6: 14. 
38 “Establishment of USIA Area Offices,” Department of State Bulletin 29 no. 743, September 21, 1953: 390. 
39 “New Country Plan for USIS/F,” March 1, 1954, US National Archives, RG 84 UD 2462, box 40. 
40 This new approach revolves around four “cardinal points of US foreign policy in France:” to forge a political 
alliance with countries defending Western civilization; to support a military structure to strengthen an integrated 
Europe; to push forward the idea that France and the United States share a common heritage; to promote free-
market economy. 
41 “Country Action Plan for USIS/F (draft),” February 2, 1954. US National Archives, RG 84 UD 2462, box 40. 
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bulk of interpersonal exchanges was conducted within the army base. In the first years upon its 
return, the army was faced with issues regarding the soldiers’ austere living conditions, for 
mud, ruts and isolation were part of day-to-day camp life. But to cope with the situation, the 
soldiers – who were also called GIs since 1941 – enjoyed inexpensive recreational activities. 
Baseball and basketball became the men’s favourite sports, played cohesively around camp. 
But on certain bases, such as the Chambley-Bussières Air Force base (USAFE), located in the 
Meurthe-and-Moselle region in the Northeastern part of France, GIs also formed teams to 
practice football, softball, golf, soccer, and even skiing. Together, they formed a new army of 
athletes, and worked hard to defend the colours of the 21st Fighter Bomber Wing. 
As Chambley veteran Charles R. Timms recalls in his account of his years on the air 
base in the 1950s, support for sport “was avid from top-down.”42 The commanders of the base 
saw sport as a cohesion marker, or in other words a tool for voluntary subordination. This 
process, which stems from the progressive professionalization of the military during the Cold 
War, aimed ultimately to guarantee the national security of the United States. Organizing sport 
and physical activities became a matter of extreme urgency for all service branches, and each 
base soon had a dedicated team.43 In Chambley, the base sports team was known as the Desert 
Rats, and was formed in the summer of 1955.44 It was put together under the initiative of 
Colonel H. C. Hartwig, “an athlete of the first water himself […] and an ex-pro with the New 
York Giants.”45 One has also to keep in mind the importance of sport to military elites, 
especially commanders, who saw in base teams an illustrious and noble way of demonstrating 
the prestige of the unit and the armed forces in general. For this reason, base commanders often 
pulled promising athletes off regular duties and made sure they dedicated enough of their time 
to athletic training or to complete adequate fitness workouts. In various fields of sporting 
competitions, winning games was essential, almost as much as winning a war.  
Needless to say, most of the time, the quest for prestige was none of the GIs’ business: 
sport came mostly as a welcome initiative for a change of pace, once servicemen were off-duty. 
In Chambley, all servicemen trained and played ball in their free time, in the 416th Fighter 
Bomber Squadron maintenance hangar, half of which had been transformed into a basketball 
court. The Desert Rats team was composed of players with, for some of them, a good amount 
of experience in basketball and new ideas of the role of the United States in the world: fighter 
pilot Lief Carlson and First Lieutenant Jerry Kincheloe had played collegiately – for the 
Universities of Minnesota and California, respectively –, while airman Jim Fields had been a 
shooting guard for the Harlem Globetrotters. All these men came to France with no prior 
 
42 Timms, Charles M. Chambley Air Base, France (1954–1967): The Best and the Worst Place We Ever Lived 
(assembled documents, 1993): 100. 
43 In 1948, the creation of the Inter-Service Sports Council (ISSC), rallying the Navy, the Army and the Air 
Force, allowed the military to consider a better organization of sports. In 1951, the United States joined the 
International Military Sports Council (IMSC), but it is only after 1954, when sport practices were regulated by 
the Department of Defense instruction 1330.4 authorizing servicemen’s “participation in armed forces, national 
and international sports activities,” that army teams were allowed to travel across Europe to play against foreign 
military and civilian teams. 
44 The Desert Rats were born at the initiative of Colonel Hartwig, former player for the NY Giants, then the only 
professional football team in New York. The team was named after the location of their base – George Air Force 
Base – located in the city of Victorville, California 
45 “Colonel Hartwig to Coach All-Stars,” Chambley Sabre (December 9, 1955): 4. 
Author final draft – Version finale auteur – 2017 
 10 
experience of the war, but saw the Air Force as a way to be employed and avoid being sent to 
fight in Southeast Asia. Also, airmen Robert Sisk and Earl Redman had tried out for the 
University of Ohio in Cincinnati and the University of Texas respectively, but dropped out to 
enrol in the US armed forces. The players’ profiles were versatile and the team’s ambitions 
very modest. The opposing teams originated mostly from fellow NATO bases in the nearby 
area. As Sisk recalled, “we played the Canadians in Marville […], and we always beat them in 
the first half; but they always had a case of Löwenbräu at half-time for us, and by the time we 
had that case of beer they beat us.”46 Such rather unconventional method to bring up army 
morale was bound to change with the creation of a European Air Force basketball league. 
In 1956, the Desert Rats entered the European Air Force basketball competition – a 
league steeped in the sporting tradition of the armed forces – with the clear objective of playing 
more than just surrounding army casern teams and to fight the Cold War on a different ground. 
The army league was divided into four conferences – France, England, Germany and the 
Mediterranean, which included Spain, Italy, Morocco, Crete, Greece, and Turkey – covering 
the entire NATO area. Eight teams competed in the French conference. But instead of fighting 
its war against the enemy – anyone sensitive to influence from Moscow –, base teams fought a 
turf war, which resulted in a diversion of the initial objectives of this initiative. For example, a 
game against Chateauroux-Déols USAFE air base, with whom the Desert Rats had a stormy 
competitive and sibling rivalry, was solved as follows: 
 
The Desert Rats travelled to Chateauroux AB, France, south of Paris, for a conference game. A 
fiercely fought contest and bad referee calls ignited a heated exchange of words between the 
Desert Rats Commander, Colonel Baker and the Chateauroux Commander. It was reported by 
team members on the bench that Colonel Baker asked the Chateauroux Commander what was his 
date-of-rank. Colonel Baker outranked the latter and the issue was settled – no blood shed.47 
 
Military pride took over the competition, and commanders often used “their date of rank to 
silence the opposing commander.” The development of a competitive spirit in inter-regiment 
sport games resulted in affirming a base identity, ultimately conveyed through the base 
newspaper, an essential by-product of military public diplomacy. 
The base paper of Chambley, launched in 1955, was called the Sabre, in reference to 
the flagship jetfighter aircrafts used by the 416th and 531st bomber squadrons operating on site. 
Base papers were published under the authority of the Public Information Division (PID). It 
presented local events in a biweekly information platform composed of four to eight pages, 
while official news and instructions were disseminated by the Department of Defense in the 
famous Stars and Stripes. In the Sabre, information about sports were mostly relegated to the 
back pages, even if the base teams’ good results in several competitions often brought them up 
to the front page. By 1956, the Desert Rats had become one of the most prominent basketball 
teams in the French conference, so much so that the American Forces Network (AFN) – the 
entertainment radio broadcasting to US military bases from Germany – “tape-recorded [several] 
 
46 Interview with Robert E. Sisk, April 21, 2016. 
47 Interview with Robert E. Sisk, November 3, 2014. 
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games for re-broadcast at a later date.”48 Sport helped to project the image of the military as a 
body of dynamic nationals, united in the core values of dedication and athleticism, and instilled 
a sense of pride in all servicemen and dependents. In January of the same year, after the Desert 
Rats had a run of twelve undefeated matches, the Sabre ran a headline that reinforced the sense 
of unity between players and spectators, using the motto of the United States seal, “E Pluribus 
Unum.”49 The public image of the Desert Rats, amplified by the circulation of the base 
newspaper, gave proof of the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. It also spread the image that 
Americans formed a vibrant and dynamic people, committed to supporting the creation of an 
integrated defence system in Europe. Ultimately, basketball played a pivotal role in forging 
links with the French population. 
 
 
3) PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS THE LINCHPIN OF THE POLITICIZATION OF 
BASKETBALL 
 
Since the 1920s, basketball has been one of the many sports that allowed for contacts 
between the French and Americans, and the Cold War is no exception to this observation. As 
stated by historian Donna Alvah, US servicemen who were stationed overseas, sometimes with 
their families, were not all removed from their local host communities.50 To the mind of military 
intelligence officers, bridging cultural gaps between the French and Americans seemed the 
safest way to carry out their duty to ensure both the security of the American people and the 
pursuit of its national interest. At this early stage of the settlement of US armed forces in French 
provincial regions, when screening measures for foreign employees on a Department of 
Defense payroll were not always enforced consistently, informal contacts allowed for foreign 
ideologies to permeate military camps and bases. Naturally, this raised security issues, but most 
importantly it circumvented the prerogatives of public information officers, who were prompt 
to react. As it is recalled in a 1955 information brochure issued by the public information office 
of the US European Command (EUCOM), published with the support of USIS-France, informal 
contacts within the borders of the base allowed for cross-cultural negotiations over general 
sporting traditions. Indeed, “after the working day,” we can read in the brochure, GIs took 
delight in “a small recreation: a football game in the field;” then, they “freshened up and had a 
drink at the mobile bar, while taking French lessons with the workers employed at the camp.”51 
The proximity with French locals working for the Americans brought the GIs to develop 
friendly cross-cultural relationships in the course of various sporting activities. The alleged 
apolitical nature of sports made them active agents of public diplomacy. 
Yet, in spite of the thaw in international relations and before Sputnik “hit” America in 
1957, US public diplomats encouraged Cold War confrontations, probably to overcome a gap 
 
48 “AFN to Tape Game,” Chambley Sabre (January 13, 1956): 4. 
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(January 27, 1956): 4. 
50 Alvah, Donna. Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War (New York: 
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in awareness about the US military presence in the field. The military seized some opportunities 
to engage citizens and servicemen directly in a cross-cultural experience. In the spring of 1956, 
Chambley-Bussières air base observed its first Armed Forces Day; for safety purposes, the 
gathering took place inside the base. For the most part, it consisted of an open-base operation, 
allowing French locals to attend military parades and to take a closer look at the American way 
of life. It is, however, important to note that this operation had an ambivalent purpose. On the 
one hand, it helped attract Frenchmen and women into a “bastion of Americana” and increase 
their understanding of the US military presence in the French countryside. On the other hand, 
it proved instrumental in benchmarking the expectations and needs of both French locals and 
US servicemen. Base commander Robert R. Rowland struggled to get soldiers involved in the 
promotion of the American military presence in Meurthe-and-Moselle: the May 18th edition of 
the Chambley base newspaper features a message from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which 
states that “in the present world situation, it is most important that our own people and others 
throughout the world who believe as we do should be cognizant of all aspects of our national 
strength – the spiritual and the moral, as well as the material and the military – and be reminded 
of our continuing efforts for peace.”52 And in the case of the Chambley-Bussières air base, only 
the Desert Rats basketball team would really manage to fulfil this mandate.  
By 1956, the Desert Rats’ acclaimed participation in the European Air Force basketball 
competitions granted them the authorization to compete with non-military teams. Indeed, 
military high-command was supportive of any initiative to “create a deeper awareness of the 
general role of the military in American life.”53 The Desert Rats carried out an unofficial 
mandate to reach out to local populations and offer a hands-on taste of American culture. For 
instance, during the 1956 open-base on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day, after visiting a 
“static display of USAF aircrafts and equipment,”54 French locals were invited to attend a game 
between the Desert Rats and the defending French Cup champions, the Club Sportif Municipal 
(CSM) in Auboué. On paper, both teams had achieved significant sporting victories during the 
previous season, so the game was supposed to be balanced. However, the image conveyed by 
the Sabre offered a different perspective on the game. Indeed, in a short article published in the 
French edition, which was intended to be distributed to and read by the visitors, the journalist 
introduces the two opposing teams. The reader learns that the CSM Auboué “was formed in 
1945 and owes its technique in large part to the contact with US teams stationed in our area 
after the Liberation.” 55 On the other hand, “the composition of the Chambley team dates back 
to last fall only; it rose quite dramatically to the French base champion, having lost two games 
only.”56 In the end, the fact that the Desert Rats defeated Auboué didn’t matter much: basketball 
helped provide French spectators with vivid images of modernity and offered a demonstration 
of strong friendship and cooperation. 
However, public participation in basketball games also had a critical political 
significance. Indeed, as servicemen on duty were busy promoting American culture to the local 
 
52 “Armed Forces Day Messages,” Chambley Sabre (May 18, 1956): 1, 4. 
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population, base commander Rowland worked on developing relations with local elected 
officials and industrialists. The objective was not only to legitimize the presence of American 
servicemen in provincial Meurthe-and-Moselle – for which purpose the military needed to exert 
a larger influence on local, national and foreign investments –, but also ensure the US global 
security interests. Moreover, two years after the French assembly rejected the European 
Defence Community, the United States experienced some difficulty in containing the public 
debate over the military presence overseas in general. For this purpose, public diplomacy 
operations granted the military an opportunity to trigger supportive relationships with the 
French, pushing the army’s social role beyond its traditional coercive function. On the other 
hand, the convergence of economic partners and their isolation from the local population sheds 
light on the social fabric of the military, and demonstrates how hierarchical relationships 
revolved around class interests and not individual profitability. The 1956 open-base operation 
in Chambley is a good example to illustrate this statement. Colonel Rowland carefully avoided 
establishing contact between the local population and elected officials. The prefect of the 
Meurthe-and-Moselle region, Jacques Samama, was invited, together with the representatives 
of French army generals René Cogny and Maurice Challe, to meet with the base commander 
as the game between the Desert Rats and the CSM Auboué was being played in the 416th 
maintenance hangar.57 Despite the visitors being aware of these meetings – they were publicly 
announced in the French edition of the base newspaper – the two worlds never converged. 
As a matter of fact, Chambley-Bussières air base provided the military high command 
with the proper conditions to operate a fragmented public diplomacy. Only a few days after the 
open-base exhibition game, the Desert Rats played against the Syracuse Nationals, a team that 
had won the 1955 NBA championship. According to the Sabre, “it was the Nats’ final game of 
a State Department sponsored tour that had stretched 24,000 miles – from Iceland to Egypt.”58 
Airman Robert Sisk recalls: 
 
We played against the Nationals with Dolph Schayes on our home court at Chambley, when they 
were on a United Service Organizations (USO) tour of military bases in Europe. Jim Fields, the 
Rats play-maker and hot shot scored 30 points to big Dolph Schayes 29. Yes, they beat us by 30 
points. Just too big for the Rats to handle but a good game to watch. Again, our bleachers in the 
hangar were filled to capacity.59 
 
Commander Rowland seized the opportunity given by the USO and the State Department to 
provide servicemen and their dependents with a unique entertainment experience.60 And for 
him, there was much to rejoice about: the Nationals were closing a 26-exhibition round across 
Europe, and “Chambley was the only American team encountered during the tour.”61 In the 
end, despite the valiant resistance displayed by the Desert Rats, “Syracuse put a team on the 
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floor that averaged 6’7” and Coach Hartwig’s little guys didn’t have a chance.”62 The Syracuse 
Nationals eventually defeated the Desert Rats by the wide margin of 112 to 72. 
Against all odds, the traditional distrust for civilian control over military activities was 
temporarily set aside, as all travel expenses for this exhibition game were covered by the USO. 
But that evening, despite the rising popularity of basketball in Europe, the gates of the 
Chambley air base remained closed to the French public. Rowland addressed the joint State 
Department and USO proposition with the firm intention of exploiting the game for political 
purposes. There were three different facets to his strategy. First, as mentioned above, civilian 
and military public information officers catered to specific target audiences. A photograph of 
the crowd cheering for the Desert Rats shows a few lieutenants and officers in military uniform, 
alongside their wives dressed in rich and festive clothing. One woman, wearing a white dress, 
stands out from the crowd: Marie-Thérèse Barre was the winner of the 1956 city of Metz beauty 
pageant, a contest sponsored annually by the local Chamber of Commerce. Second, AFN 
commentators travelled to Chambley with Stars and Stripes journalists. Together, they recorded 
the game live and wrote articles that would later be dispatched to other military or base 
newspapers. AFN eventually broadcast the game at a later date, after all commentaries had been 
edited and the message deemed suitable for public delivery. Third, this game served as an 
instrument for the military establishment to prove to both the spectators in the hangar and the 
listeners of AFN network that sport was still an instrument for physical fitness and mental 
sharpness, proving the quality of the physical and military preparedness of the United States 
army. Base commander Rowland used public participation in sports events to convince his 
fellow American citizens that the military was strong enough to guarantee the national security 
of the United States and safeguard its territorial integrity. Therefore, public participation was a 
decisive factor in the politicization of basketball. In this case, public diplomacy proves how 
active it had been on the home front, despite the boycott imposed by the Smith-Mundt act on 
the active dissemination of information. 
By the Spring of 1957, the Desert Rats had eventually become “basketball ambassadors 
for Chambley,”63 said Sisk. This statement is certainly true, and first and foremost they were 
ambassadors on their home base. On March 9, Chambley hosted the first basketball All-Star 
Game of the 12th Air Force, the first of its kind in Europe. There, “twelve players from the US 
French conference [played] against twelve players from the US German conference; selectees 
from Chambley included Fields, Carlson, Redman, Kincheloe and Sisk,”64 the latter recalls. But 
building on its experience, the Chambley public information office also called upon its network 
to attend the event. The All-Star Game was indeed a matter of pride for the base commander: 
the sporting qualities of Chambley’s players mattered less than the quality of entertainment and 
number of local officials and elites – such as the deputy prefect of Briey –, as well as some of 
its representatives who had come see the game. In its report, the Sabre reads: 
 
Halftime will be highlighted by the attendance of Monique Lambert, who won the Miss France 
title in 1955 and finished third in the Miss Europe contest of 1955. Also attending will be Marie-
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Thérèse Barre, Miss Metz and Queen of the Mirabelle of 1956. General Gerhart will crown Miss 
Lambert and her court during the half-time intermission. Miss Lambert will be crowned “All-Star 
Queen.”65 
 
Moreover, “the game will be broadcast by the Armed Forces Network, French National Radio 
and TV and also by Télévision Luxembourg; also attending will be representatives from French 
and American newspapers.”66 In the end, information broadcasts targeted both French and 
American citizens. 
Ultimately, in the eyes of the military high command, the success of the 1957 All-Star 
Game gave enough credit to the Desert Rats to authorize a tour around Europe. They competed 
in international tournaments in Alfortville, Lyon, Dijon or Montbrison and, by the time the air 
base closed in 1961, had played multiple exhibition games. Sometimes, basketball even allowed 
for unexpected situations: 
 
Competition was against national, and to some extent, semi-pro talent. The Rats were the first 
Americans to play against a Russian communist bloc country, Poland. The Cold War in the 1950s 
was a real concern. Air Force Command was concerned about the possibility of an international 
incident playing against Poland. After tournament play was concluded, and prior to the awards 
and banquet dinner, three American officers on the team were sent back to Chambley due to safety 
concerns, and the expendables (the airmen) and Coach (Colonel) Hartwig were left to enjoy the 
banquet festivities that followed. Everything went smoothly.67 
 
Tracked by AFN radio and French and American newspapers, the Desert Rats had enough 
passion for basketball and enough motivation to break the monotony of army life to turn, more 
or less unknowingly, into agents of US public diplomacy. In Chambley, basketball was subject 
to a strategy of politicization by civilian and military offices. But for the 22 year-old players 
from the West of the United States, at a time when regular American citizens were drafted and 
sent to Vietnam, it provided enough support to trust the military establishment and subsequently 
follow a military career. And Sisk to conclude: “Chambley was not an American All Star team, 
just a group of talented players from all walks of life across America who just happened to be 
assigned to the 21st Fighter Bomber Wing stationed in France.”68 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This investigation questioned the practices of US public diplomacy throughout almost 
half of the twentieth century. In the American tradition, sports provided the US armed forces 
with a tool for civic, but also educational and physical well-being. During the Cold War, civilian 
officers such as Leslie S. Brady, Chief Public Affairs Officer of the US Information Services 
in Paris, opened a breach in the possibility to use sports as a form of diplomacy, especially on 
 
65 “All Star Game Here Tomorrow,” Chambley Sabre, March 8, 1957. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Interview with Robert E. Sisk, April 21, 2016. 
68 Ibid. 
Author final draft – Version finale auteur – 2017 
 16 
the field, after the failure of the European Defence Community. If sports are hardly ever 
considered in equal terms to other forms of diplomacy – whether cultural, citizen or economic 
diplomacy – to promote American democratic values to the French, this paper revealed the 
work of “basketball ambassadors” and demonstrated its efficiency, both in achieving public 
diplomacy objectives and in complying with national security legislation. But it is most 
undoubtedly during the NATO era that basketball, unlike the cage players – ordinary men from 
all walks of life across America, who remain mostly apolitical today – became increasingly 
politicized. 
However, the framework provided for the implementation and the promotion of 
American sports abroad also brought its share of challenges, leaving both civilian and military 
offices somewhat helpless. Indeed, many observers and practitioners saw in the precepts of 
public diplomacy a set of tacit and unspoken understandings, which had become increasingly 
coercive. And yet, thirty-one years of casual acculturation through sports reveal, on two 
accounts, how unusual the trajectory of the Chambley Desert Rats was for a team of young 
American servicemen stationed in Cold War France. First, each base was functioning as a “little 
America,” so their jurisdiction was entirely subject to the laws of the United States. 
Consequently, the players’ morale depended on the legal status regimenting all US military 
premises established overseas. The enforcement of the Smith-Mundt act of 1948 constituted 
therefore a domestic political boycott on sports practices. Second, caught between doctrinaire 
policymakers in Washington, the Desert Rats overcame the pressure of the implicit military 
boycott abroad, induced by the Cold War foreign policy of the Western alliance. Allowing for 
a game against a team from the other side of the Iron Curtain must have been unheard of in the 
1950s. But in both cases, while basketball bowed to political pressure, the Desert Rats enjoyed 
the publicity and continued “shooting hoops with foreign teams.”69 
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